China in the Next Century by Goodman, David SG
17
 Number 3, 1996The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
ARTICLES
CHINA IN THE NEXT CENTURY
David S G Goodman
The outlook for the post-Deng era
China in the Year 2000 will be dramatically different to the China that faced
Deng Xiaoping and the reformers within the leadership of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party [CCP] when they embarked upon their reform program in 1978. Twenty
years of reform will have transformed the society and politics of the People’s
Republic of China [PRC] as well as its economy, in ways that were frankly incon-
ceivable in the early 1980s. At that time as China embarked on its “New Long
March” targets were set that were greeted with widespread skepticism by ana-
lysts outside China and not a few even within the PRC. The most derided was
the aim of doubling and then redoubling output by the Year 2000 - in the event
it was achieved easily by 1995.1
China’s economic transformation will have been the most obvious feature
of the previous twenty years of reform. Poor economic performance was re-
placed by fast and sustained economic growth so that it now seems likely that
sometime in the second decade of the Twenty-first Century China will be the
world’s largest aggregate economy. Though the command economy will still
exist and remain at the heart of China’s economic system, its role will be substan-
tially diminished, not least because economic management has moved from a
system of direct intervention to one based on the introduction of market forces
and the exercise of macro-economic controls.2 most dramatically in aggregate
terms the state sector of the economy will produce about 27% of industrial
output value and be responsible for less than a fifth of GDP.3
Reform will have effected social and political change no less significantly,
not least because of the introduction of the market and the development of a
1 Scepticism may be found, for example, in C Howe and K R Walker (ed) ‘The Readjustment
in the Chinese Economy1 in The China Quarterly No. 100, December 1984 Similarly within
the PRC it is worth remembering that the failure of Shenzhen and the other Special
Economic Zones [SEZ] was heralded on many occasions before the late 1980s with serious
consideration given to their closure.
2 D J Solinger China’s Transition from Socialism: Statistic legacies and market reforms
1980-1990 New York, M E Sharpe, 1993 presents a far-reaching analysis of the processes
and consequences of these economic changes.
3 PRC estimates for the year 2000 in Went Weir Po 13 July 1992, p 5.
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consumer society, as well as the redefinition of politics that has accompanied
change. The essential principle of reform is that the party-state is prepared to
surrender absolute control in return for economic growth and the continuation
of its own political leadership, in the belief that it can still guide through moral
suasion where once it commanded. The results include considerably less cen-
tralization, greater foreign involvement and influences in China, and increased
social mobility, as well as significant social dislocation.
China in the Year 2000 will be altogether-more socially complex, economi-
cally developed, and politically more open than was the case in the late 1970s,
though the consequences of reform may still remain uncertain. These dramatic
changes invite comparison with similar processes experienced elsewhere and
else when. There are elements of the experience of imploding communism (and
the subsequent political disintegration) in the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope; of the emergence of capitalism and liberal democracy in Western Europe
during the Nineteenth Century; and of the transformation of authoritarianism in
East Asia (notably in South Korea, Taiwan and even Japan) since the 1970s to be
found in China’s reform era.
Social and political change in China since 1978 has indeed been massively
dislocating on many levels of its political economy. At the same time, compari-
son with other historical experiences must also acknowledge China’s specific
characteristics and particular problems. Geopolitics, geo-economics and ideol-
ogy all reinforce the essential unity of, the Chinese state rather than suggesting
disintegration. The party-state both institutionally and association ally remains
at the heart of economic development in the reform era, and indeed central to the
emerging political economy. Moreover, China’s size is likely to make a qualita-
tive and not just a quantitative difference to the development of its political
economy as an East Asian power, so that a more accurate perspective might be
to see the PRC as a series of South Koreas or Taiwan’s rather than in direct
comparison.4
Transformations in the Chinese state
China’s reform era resulted from the crisis facing the CCP leadership in the
post-Mao period. When the CCP had come to power in 1949 it had been with the
promise of economic modernization and political stability, in contrast to the
4 For an analysis of China’s political economy in comparative perspective see David S G
Goodman Transformations in the Chinese State: Historical perspectives on reform’ in
Journal of the Oriental Society of Australia  Volt 23/24 1994, p.52.
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mass starvations, instability and lack of political unity that had characterized the
first half of the century. By the late 1970s the CCP’s record on both was consid-
erably tarnished. The economy had stagnated for some twenty years, there had
been repeated economic crises leading to famine and starvation, and there had
been no rise in most people’s wages.5 the poor economic performance was
partly a function of political instability. Every four or five years after 1949 there
was a major change in the direction of the PRC’s development strategy, the
organizational forms of the state, and the personnel responsible for the imple-
mentation of policy.6 At the same time from the 1960s on, elsewhere in East Asia
economies with many less obvious advantages were transforming themselves
into “tiger economies”.
By late 1978 the CCP had to start to deliver on its promises if it wanted to
stay in power. It faced a crisis of confidence which threatened to undermine its
position, and the policies that followed were designed to ensure economic growth
and political stability, and to restore its legitimacy. It is common to regard China’s
reform era as one that delivered economic reform and growth, but one in which
substantial political change was neither permitted nor attained. It is certainly the
case that Deng Xiaoping agreed with Lee Kuan Yew-type reform that it would be
most desirable to obtain economic modernization without political change.7
Nonetheless, in addition to significant political reforms the reform era aiso
saw the start of substantial transformations in tne-Chinese state. Politics has been
redefined, yielding political space for private activities, and not only in the exer-
cise of economic entrepreneurship. The changing structure of China’s economy,
and in particular the growth of new corporate entities, has influenced its political
economy and the basis of state power. The growth of an intense regionalism has
presented a challenge not for the most part to the unity of the state but certainly to
the relationship between central government and the provinces.
The growth of the private sector of the economy has generated much
interest, both inside and outside China, not least because of the contrast with
the recent past. However, it has not led to the development of an independent
5 See, for example: R M Field ‘Slow Growth of Labor Productivity in Chinese Industry’ in The
China Quarterly No.96, December 1983, p.641.
6 For and overview of the near constant political instability, see, for example: J Domes the
Internal Politics of China, 1949-1972 C Hurst, London, 1973, and J Domes China after the
Cultural Revolution C Hurst, London, 1976.
7 Deng Xiaoping’s favorable comments on Singapore were made in 1992 and may be found in
“Excerpts from talks given in Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shanghai” January 18-
February 21 1992 IV, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping Vol.Ill (1982-1992) Beijing,
Foreign Languages Press, 1994, p.366
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capitalist class who might come to challenge for state power. The private sector
of the economy has for the most part remained small-scale and low-technology.
Large parts of the retail sector and many commercial activities have become
dominated by private entrepreneurs, but the private sector’s share of industrial-
ization remains small. When private enterprise wants to grow the tendency is for
it to cease activity in the private sector and to restructure itself as a collective
sector enterprise.8
The collective sector represents not only the most dynamic sector of the
industries economy, but also the growth of China’s new corporate sector. 9
Before the reform era the collective sector was that part of the public economy
not governed by the state plan - collective sector enterprises received no auto-
matic or subsidized allocations. It was essentially a second and poorer state
sector. One ideological justification ‘or this difference was that whilst state
enterprises belonged to all the people, collective enterprises belonged to the
responsible collective: either a locality or the workers in the enterprise them-
selves.
With reform the collective sector has been more able to respond to market
pressures and structural reforms. State enterprises have larger overheads, in-
cluding guaranteed labour costs that collective enterprises do not face. Enter-
prise reform started mainly in the countryside with town and village collectives
being encouraged to take advantage of the new economic environment.
Underutilised resources were turned to more productive ends - agricultural ma-
chinery repair workshops in the suburban villages became light industrial facto-
ries manufacturing for export; car pools became taxi services, lorry teams freight
delivery services. By the mid-1990s there were many suburban villages in South
and East China that had become growing industrial conglomerates with little or
no relationship to agricultural production.
Increasingly too after 1984 as the processes of economic reform were also
brought to urban China, the same principles of enterprise reform were also ap-
plied. However, in this case many state sector enterprises, or even social organi-
zations with some economic capacity -such as schools or trade unions - were
8 S Young “Policy, Practice and the Private Sector in China” in the Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs No.21, 1989; and “Wealth but not Security: Attitudes towards Private
Business in China in the 1960s” in the Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No25, 1991
9 V Nee “Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights,
and Mixed Economy in China” in Administrative Science Quarterly Vol 37, No 1, 1992; and
D S G Goodman ‘Collectives and Connectives, Capitalism and Corporatism: Structural
change in China’s economy’ in The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics
Vol.11, no.1, March 1995, p.12, both examine changes in the collective sector.
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able to redirect their underutilised resources in the establishment of collective
sector enterprises. A steel factory with a glass products workshop might estab-
lish a glass bottle and jamjar factory as a collective enterprise; a machining
workshop might become an electronic timer factory. Often where the new collec-
tives came out of state enterprises the latter would establish a holding company.
Almost always local government would be involved in the new collective enter-
prise, through the provision of some equity (usually land and buildings) and
administrative regulation. The new collective sector has some claim to be regarded
as a local government economy because of the extent of these relationships.
The strength of the local government economy helps explain the third way
in which the collective sector has grown. Private entrepreneurs wanting to grow
and become more technologically advanced or capital intensive usually turn
their enterprise into a collective in cooperation with local government. The latter
provides not only some equity and political protection, but also a better eco-
nomic environment. Collective enterprises can more easily obtain loans for de-
velopment and at lower rates of interest than for the private sector. They also
pay less taxes and fees and are subject to less administrative regulation.
The growth of the collective sector is likely to gradually alter the political
economy of CCP rule, and indeed at the local level has already done so. Local
government, business people, local entrepreneurs and enterprise managers still
come together under the aegis of the CCP, but with new agendas. Party meetings
are more like a cross between a club for local notables and the Rotary or Lions
associations.
At the more rarefied end of the political hierarchy, regionalism is also
having an important impact on the exercise of politics. China has rarely been as
centralized or conformist as the totalitarian image would suggest. Since the late
1930s the CCP has adopted an administrative policy of “Doing the best accord-
ing to local conditions” in which the centre laid down broad guidelines with
detailed policies on implementation to be a matter for local determination. Even
during the height of a Soviet-style political economy in China during the early
1950s there was considerably more decentralization in economic management
Demitted than was the case in the Soviet Union.
None the less, the reform era through its policies of decentralization n
economic management, the introduction of market forces and of increased exter-
nal economic relations (‘the open door’) has markedly shifted the balance of
power between central and provincial governments. Not least because the “state
idea” of China as a whole predominates, the intense regionalism is unlikely to
lead to the “break-up” in any sense of the Chinese polity. However, it is likely to
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lead to and has already demonstrated the ability for regions and provinces to be
more autonomous. Such considerations must be tempered by a recognition that
disputes between central government and any specific province remain within a
single ruling group at the apex of the CCP, and not between the CCP and the
population at large of that province. However, provincial authorities clearly
have more say over their own destinies than ever before since the establishment
of the PRC.10
Political difficulties
In general the experience of modernization would suggest that social dis-
location and political change are necessary consequences. The key questions
are not whether there will be problems but of what kind and with what conse-
quences. In China’s case the rapid pace of change and high economic growth
rates since 1978 have probably magnified many of the problems that have re-
sulted. In particular, the transition from a command to a market economy, and the
movement of large numbers of economic migrants within the country, both within
a relatively short period of time, has created additional strains. At the same time
and by the same token, China’s experience of problems in the present and imme-
diate future does not of itself indicate an end to political stability or the disinte-
gration of an ordered society.
Political change during the reform era may well have been more fundamen-
tal and far-reaching than either the CCP or conventional wisdom would yet care
to admit. None the less it has not occurred without its problems and paradoxes.
Perhaps the most startling is the extent to which China remains a pre-modern
political system. Indeed, a major paradox of the reform era centered on Deng
Xiaoping’s personal role in the reform process.
One of the key political reforms was the attempt to institutionalize politics
- to remove the persona list characteristics that exemplified the Mao-dominated
era of China’s politics. To that end reform stressed not the role of individuals,
but of collective leadership, “party life” and the importance of regulation. To
that end Deng Xiaoping himself refused the offer of appointment as Chairman of
the CCP in the early 1980s when it was offered. 11 On the other hand, much of the
reform momentum, particularly after the mid-1980s, would not have been main-
tained without Deng’s personal intervention. Throughout the 1980s he inter-
vened in politics consistently to check political liberalization and to ensure the
10 China’s new evolving regionalism is discussed in D S G Goodman and G Segal (ed) China
Deconstructs: politics, trade and regionalism London, Rutledge, 1994.
11 D S G Goodman Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution London, Rutledge, 1994, p.97.
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maintenance of relatively fast economic reform. The most spectacular example
of the latter was Deng’s “Inspection Tour of the South” which virtually single-
handedly reignited national-level enthusiasm for a policy of fast export-oriented
growth after the government-induced recession during the second half of 1989.12
One reason that Deng Xiaoping may have felt it necessary to intervene
personally even after he had withdrawn from the ‘front line’ of administration in
the mid-1980s was because there were genuine political disagreements within
the leadership. In the early stages of reform the leadership could unite relatively
easily on what it did not want (the Cultural Revolution) and how to proceed
(gradually with the rural areas as the base). However, differences began to ap-
pear in the leadership with the introduction of reform to urban China in late 1984.
By the National Party Conference of September 1985 these had become quite
obvious and well-articulated. This was not a dispute about whether there should
be reform, but a series of differences of opinion about the speed and general
direction of reform.
In part disagreement within the leadership of the CCP was a function of the
process of China’s modernization. It is easy to equate China’s post-1978 eco-
nomic growth with the modernization of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and
South Korea in and after the 1960s. Whilst there are many points of similarity
there are also significant differences including in particular that China’s post-
1978 growth and development has been a second stage modernization. From
1952 to 1978 China had already started to modernize. A modernizing state had
already started to come into existence well before 1978 and a modem bureau-
cracy and education system was established from the early 1950s. The period
since 1978 has seen economic restructuring not first stage modernization. One
important political consequence is that China now possesses two modernizing
elites who may often conflict: those from before 1978 and the era of Mao-domi-
nated politics; and those closely associated with the reform agenda.
In addition, disagreement within the leadership was also simply a function
of the greater diversity accompanying modernization. This is shown most clearly
in the context of the changing relations between the centre and the provinces.
Decentralization, the redefinition of politics and the introduction of market forces
into the economy have generally strengthened the hand of the provinces vis-à-
vis central government. However, that trend has not necessarily meant that
every province has aspired to less central involvement; or even that each has
favored faster reform in national debates about that topic.
12 See, for example: R Baum Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping
Princeton University Press, 1994, especially p.341 ff.
 Number 3, 1996
24
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs
Some provinces - Guangdong is the obvious example - clearly have sought
greater autonomy, less to do with the centre and a fairly rapid sustained reform
process.13 at the same time, there is a wide variety of attitudes to be found on the
speed of reform ranging from the cautious to the enthusiastic. There are even
provinces which, whilst favoring reform, have preferred to lobby for greater
central investment and involvement, sometimes even quite aggressively. Xinjiang,
for example, made this point forcefully when it engaged in protectionist mea-
sures during 1989 and 1990 because, in its own view, if it was not to receive
central assistance then it had to look after its own activities.14
Considerations of the elite apart, the problem for the CCP in. initiating
reform of any kind, but particularly political reform, has always been that it has
almost no room for maneuver and runs the risk of creating a revolution of rising
expectations, which it cannot meet. The CCP wants to reform the system it has
created but still retain control: to give in to external demands but still to control
the extent to which it meets those demands and their results. Nowhere is this
problem clearer than in the CCP’s appeal to democracy, not least because its
meaning has been variable, and remains so for different sections of the popula-
tion.
As the 1990s move on, it would not be surprising to find the emergence of
yet new voices from within the political and economic structures being created
by the reform process claiming a slice of the political action. Sometimes, as in the
case of the development of the collective sector of the economy to date, those
new voices may have very close connections to the established party-state.
However, it is the CCP’s ability to assimilate interests and maintain its own
equilibrium that may well is the key to its future.
The CCP’s response to its self-induced problems of social control has
been an appeal to “Chinese ness” as a unifying and obligatory political myth,
rather than to the class conflict that characterized the Mao-dominated years of
China’s politics. This pre-modern form of nationalism is more of a vague cultural
nationalism than one allied to a specific state or government. Though the CCP
attempts to portray itself as the guardian of this ‘Chinese ness’ it is almost as if
13 Feng Chongyi and D S G Goodman “Guangdong: Greater Hong Kong and the New Region-
alist Future” in D S G Goodman and G Segal (Ed) China Deconstructs: politics, trade and
regionalism Rutledge, London, 1994, p 177.
14 Chao Chine-min Tiao-t’iao vs. k’uai-k’uai: A perennial dispute between the central and
local governments in Mainland China” in Issues and Studies August 1991, p 40; D S G
Goodman “Provinces confronting the state ?” in Kuan Hsin-chi and M.Brosseau (ends)
China Review 1992 Chinese University Press, Hong Kong, 1992.
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it also sub-consciously realizes that the political system is in transition. Even
within the CCP there is a recognition that the definition of ‘Chinese ness’ may lie
outside its control: hence its importance as a current political issue.
Economic development
The consequences and problems of rapid economic development in China
since the late 1970s have been so obvious and so potentially threatening, that it
is often difficult to imagine that growth can be sustained. The most obvious
problems are the lack of an adequate economic infrastructure, both physical and
financial, and their consequences, which include inflation and massive disloca-
tion. Whilst these, and other problems, cannot be dismissed, yet more serious
difficulties may be found with the inadequacies of the workforce and the scale of
environmental degradation.
China’s transport difficulties are one set of infrastructural problems that
pre-date even the reform era. North-South transportation of people and freight
has been historically difficult and was but little improved after 1949. The main
river systems - the Yangtze and the Yellow River - flow West-East, with relatively
few railroads (for the population and distances covered) and until the 1980s
almost no long-distance roads or roadhaulage, and a similarly under-developed
domestic air-system. China has one of the world’s largest coalfields in the Odors
Basin of North China, but because of domestic transport problems South China
imports coal from the rest of the world.
The development of the economy’s physical infrastructure was distorted
not a little by the planned economic geography of the Mao-dominated years.
During the 1960s and early 1970s the overwhelming proportion of capital invest-
ment in China was directed to the development of the relatively isolated Central-
West and Southwest of China in line with Mao’s belief that the country should
be able to defend itself in depth in case of attack. The result was that the more
economically advanced areas were starved of resources which were directed to
other areas at an even higher unit cost where communications and supplies
were weak and markets non-existent.15
Dismantling the command economy that enabled such a developmental
strategy to be implemented has certainly redressed some of the imbalances.
However, at the same time it has caused other social and economic problems.
The inequity within the command economy between urban and rural prices was
15 B Naughton the Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior’ in The
China Quarter No 115 September 1988 p351
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a major and increasing source of tension throughout the 1980s and into the
1990s. Removing that inequity - which effectively meant that rural areas heavily
subsidized the towns and cities - has had an inflationary impact and caused
social dislocation. The run on the banks and saving accounts in urban areas
during the middle of 1988 has had shock effects which continue to be felt, and
remembered by both government and the population at large.
A major problem is that though the CCP has been committed to the re-
placement of administrative controls with macro-economic instruments, the lat-
ter have long been stymied at the design stage. Central government has done a
relatively good job of controlling inflation. Each time it threatens to run away the
situation has been stabilized. However, on each occasion the mechanism used
has been crude administrative fiat, rather than any more sophisticated controls
of money supply or interest rates.
Beyond the establishment of the People’s Bank of China as the central
bank, few macro-economic controls have been introduced. This is symptomatic
of the lack of an adequate national financial infrastructure which in turn pre-
sents limits to the growth of an integrated domestic market. From the available
evidence it seems that interprovincial trade has barely increased during the
reform era; growth has come in exports and imports.16
One particularly important area in which infrastructural development has
failed to keep pace with rising demand has been in the provision of education
and training. Expenditure on education has barely risen during the reform era.
There have been considerable increases in the provision of educational ser-
vices at the most advanced end of the university system. However, there have
been few if any improvements at the levels of skilled and semi-skilled labor. This
must necessarily act as a brake on economic development as there is a limit to
the growth that can be predicated on unskilled migrant (from poorer parts of the
country) labor working shift-work on low-technology assembly lines - very
much the norm up to now.17
Another set of economic problems concerns the impact of modernization
on the environment. Every North China city is thick with coal dust, particularly
during winter. Rivers and waterways have similarly become repositories for in-
dustrial effluent and waste. These are serious problems and limits to economic
16 A Kumar “Economic reform and the internal division of’ labor in China: production, trade
and marketing” in D S G Goodman and G Segal (Ed) China Deconstructs: politics, trade and
regionalism London, Routledge, 1994, p.99.
17 See, for example: C Herrmann-Pillath Marktwirtschaft in China: geschichte-struktuntn
transformation Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1995, especially p.168 ff.
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growth but still not as immediate as the overuse of natural resources, particu-
larly water, in some areas. Parts of North China have increasingly had severe
water shortages for the last few years because of poor environmental controls
and husbandry.
Drought is fairly common in North China, and this combined with no envi-
ronmental protection has reduced or poisoned water tables in many places. In
some cities it is common to find productive enterprises on three-day weeks,
even in the state sector and even in strategic industries. There is environmental
protection legislation in some of the provinces; and some provincial leaders
have made policy stands on the need for environmental protection, sustainable
development and ‘green’ policies. However, the major problem facing all such
activities is that there is no generalised acceptance of such regulation, and
probably not much recognition of regulation as a whole.18
Social outlook
The social impact of reform has clearly been both great and problematical,
though not always in the ways articulated by the leaders of the CCP. They
realized at an early stage that whilst reform may have been needed because of a
crisis in its popular support, as reform progressed it would also be likely to
create new crises of confidence. The response, as already noted, was an appeal
to a kind of pre-modern nationalism: an undefined “Chinese ness”. Whilst the
CCP has concentrated its attention on the potential for value change - in order to
arrest such development - problems of urbanization, migrant populations, and
social welfare provision have also become apparent.
It is hardly surprising that “moral decay”, corruption and value change
should be important items on the agenda of the CCP during the era of reform.
Even a reforming communist party is certain to have problems with its loss of a
moral monopoly as it allows and even encourages society to become more
complex and diverse. At the same time and almost regardless of CCP predisposi-
tions there remains behavior and activity that is generally regarded as corrupt.
Though the CCP argues that corruption results from a moral failure, it may
also be structurally determined. The lack of both any rule of law or general
acceptance of regulation not only makes the definition of corruption very diffi-
cult, it basically explains the transitory nature of such concerns. Corruption
occurs because in part individuals are being encouraged to take initiatives but
18 See, for example: C W Lo “Law and Administration in Deng’s China: Legalization of the
Administration of Environmental Protection” in Review of Central and East European
Law No 5 1992.
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the regulatory frameworks within which they operate are weak or non-existent.
The CCP in consequence has to try to instill some wider responsibility by stress-
ing the importance of moral decay.
The lack of regulative frameworks in general creates social problems in a
number of ways. The impact on environmental conservation has already been
noted. In addition, social welfare provision in the new enterprises created by the
reform process has until very recently been virtually non existent and remains
extremely poor. One of the reasons for the growth of the collective sector has
been its lack of labor regulation, lower labor costs and greater flexibility New
entrepreneurs in the faster growing areas can and do recruit young teenagers
from the poorer parts of the country to come and work for relatively low wages,
by the standard of the faster growing areas, but high earnings by their own
home-town standards. There is usually little if any provision for worker’s insur-
ance or pension schemes, though most employers provide accommodation.
Those who travel for guaranteed employment in the factories and enter-
prises of the faster growing areas face and may cause considerable social prob-
lems, including those associated with acceptance by their host communities.
However, such problems pale into insignificance by comparison with those
associated with the estimated 50-100 million “drifters” who move, largely from
economic necessity, looking for work.19 These migrants are to be found all over
China and not only in the faster growing parts of the country. The easing of
restrictions on movement, the introduction of market forces into the economy,
and the emphasis on individual effort have led many to look for work elsewhere
Many have drifted to Guangdong, Shanghai and the Eastern seaboard. How-
ever, there has also been significant migration of this kind - involving peddlers,
small business people, shopkeepers and the like - into other parts of China. For
the most part whilst such migration undoubtedly causes problems it is unlikely
to have any longer-term adverse significance for social harmony. Tibet is an
obvious exception, where Han Chinese migration may threaten local culture.
Almost a defining feature of reform has been a change in the urban land-
scape. In addition to the development and transformation of central business
districts, most cities and towns have expanded their areas of economic activity
- even if official government boundaries have not yet been adjusted to take
account of such growth. Suburban villages were the first areas to be allowed to
experiment with new industrial enterprises ànd other economic activities and
they have for the most part maintained their development.
19 D J SoHnger China’s Transients and the State: a Form of Civil Society? Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991.
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The suburban villages have been at the heart of economic growth, particu-
larly in the collective sector. As they have grown they have merged into the
urban conurbation - including the ownership, control or management of land
within the towns and cities - in a number of ways, whilst still retaining their
official “rural” registration, which provides a more flexible economic environ-
ment for enterprise development. Urbanization of this kind is no problem in
itself. However, the existence of two or more regulative frameworks for other-
wise identical activities or environments may be a source of tension and dys-
functional.
Population control is one area in which the reform era has been relatively
successful, but which paradoxically has the potential to cause problems for the
future. Particularly in urban China the ‘one child’ policy has led to radically
different expectations for coming generations than those held earlier by their
parents. Already it is clear that there is a significant generation gap between
those who grew to maturity before 1976 (and the death of Mao Zedong) and
later generations. Despite the widespread unpopularity of the politics and poli-
cies of the Cultural Revolution, earlier generations seem generally more altruis-
tically-minded. New entrepreneurs from those generations are more likely to
engage in acts of public philanthropy, endowing a school or building a ceremo-
nial arch, than their generational successors. The impact of a generation of
single children may cause not simply generational conflict but also a paradigm
shift in urban China’s world-view.
Longer-term prospects
The experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe appears to present
severe challenges to China’s political future. However, it is far from clear that the
parallels between China and the former Soviet Union are exact enough to justify
predictions of either the implosion of communist rule or the disintegration of the
unified state. Although the political structures of the PRC were established by
and along the line of the Soviet Union during the early 1950s, there the parallels
end. The population of the USSR was more urbanized, intellectualized and more
used to mass politics. Unlike its Soviet counterpart the CCP came to power
through a protracted process of war and civil war, based on mass mobilization.
Whilst that contrast does not guarantee the CCP wide popular support, it does
provide the opportunity, particularly in North China, where its roots run deep.
Moreover, China’s contemporary political culture differs in two important
respects from that which characterized the former communist party states of
Europe and the Soviet Union. The first is that the CCP has presided over a
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rapidly growing economy. There has been a rising standard of living, not just
since 1978, but over the whole period of the People’s Republic of China. The
second is that, with only two or three exceptions, there are few regional chal-
lenges within China to the ‘state-idea’ of China as a whole. Unlike the USSR or
Yugoslavia, the unity of the state has a long history. Its provinces have been
determined by the circulation of people, goods and ideas in each locality over
some two thousand years, and not by some Twentieth Century notion of nation-
alism and administrative fiat. 20 The exceptions - Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia
- are precisely those non-Han areas with their own independent traditions which
do not share China’s ‘state-idea’.
China’s political economy changed dramatically during 1979-1982. In those
years through sheer political will the leaders of the CCP forced through the
major reform that later defeated their communist counterparts in Europe and the
Soviet Union. They removed the stranglehold of heavy industry on the economy
by diverting sufficient investment into light and consumer industry. The amount
was not fantastically large - it is estimated at only some 3-4% of GNP - but it has
significantly influenced elite-level politics; altered the trajectory of national eco-
nomic planning; and resulted in the development of a consumer society, with all
the attendant political as well as social and economic implications.21
China’s future is more likely to be that of an authoritarian and modernizing
regime, similar in many respects to those that developed in Japan, Taiwan and
South Korea. The state’s dominance of society and its leading position in the
economy is likely to remain a central characteristic of its political economy. Its
political institutions are likely to be dominated by the nexus of relationships
described by business, bureaucracy and politicians, and their access to wealth,
power and status. In those terms it hardly matters how many political parties
compete elect orally. The formal political system would thus remain dominated
either by the CCP or some successor institution which provides the essential
framework for the exercise of economic as well as political power.
At the same time China’s emerging politics are likely to display an
unprecedently high degree of regionalism. Economic growth since 1978 has
been regional rather than national with regions having considerable autonomy
particularly with respect to their own economic development, and the ability to
utilize any comparative advantage in the international marketplace. Continued
20 J B R Whitney China: Area, Administration and Nation-Building University of Chicago,
Department of Geography Research Paper no. 123, 1970.
21D J SoMnger from Lathes to Looms: China’s Industrial Policy, 1979-1982 Stanford
UnVeretty Press, 1991.
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growth seems certain to be highly regionalized with new areas of growth within
China being economically integrated with different East Asian economies, as
has already occurred with Taiwan, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and to
a lesser extent Japan.
China’s unity will be affected but not necessarily adversely. Increased
economic interaction and a domestic division of labor may strengthen economic
integration and political unity. An effective federalism in practice - though not in
name or legally not least because of the absence of a tradition of a rule of law -
is also a distinct possibility. Chinese culture has long been polycentric; it was
only the rigid conformism of the late Qing Empire and the state under Mao
Zedong that emphasized its centralist aspects.22
The future of the CCP is less certain. There can be little doubt that the CCP
is currently undergoing considerable change. The new economic elites who
have been recruited in the era of reform have radically different perspectives on
life as well as politics to their predecessors. Though they may be only too
willing to reach accommodations with the current party-state they are also part
of a process which is changing it from within. At the local level this means  %
that the party is much less an organization for ideological activity and more
concerned with economic development and providing opportunities for net-
working.
Agents of Change
The CCP is not particularly popular, and may even be actively unpopular
among certain sectors of the vocal and educated. However, the strongest argu-
ment for its continued hold on power is the lack of an organized alternative.
Within China at the moment, most ideas for political reform, let alone those
advocating radical change, remain muted - understandably since June 1989.
None the less they exist, though paradoxically as much if not more within the
CCP and the establishment as in society at large.
Stability depends - as it has ever since the Third Plenum of December 1978
- on the CCP’s capacity to keep its nerve and to mediate economic and political
problems and social conflict. For the most part the evidence of the 1980s and
1990s would seem to suggest such exercise of its power is not wildly impossible.
The events of mid-1989, when the leadership of the CCP did appear more than a
little bewildered and to have at least temporarily lost its nerve, were clearly an
exception. However, an understanding and interpretation of those events are
22 See, for example: S Naquin and E Rawski (ed) Chinese Society in the Eighteenth Centwy
Yale University Press, 1987.
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now integral parts of the environment in which the leadership must operate and
they limit its room for maneuver. Civilian and military reaction to the events of
1989 both contemporaneously and since probably makes it difficult for the CCP
leadership to repeat its actions. At the same time the events of May-June 1989
provide instructive lessons so that preemptive action might be taken to avoid
such conflicts and crises in future.
Those who populate the party-state system remain the key organized
agents of political change. Without exaggerating their abilities they both see the
need to accommodate China’s new social forces and to learn from the lessons of
the collapse of communist rule in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
The communist officials in Eastern Europe who placed themselves at the head of
movements for radical change were third or fourth generation revolutionaries,
facing major economic problems and surrounded by the apparent attractions of
democracy. The current CCP leadership in contrast is dominated by the first
post-revolutionary generation buoyed by economic success and surrounded
by a political discourse in East and Southeast Asia that stresses the synergy
between economic growth and authoritarianism.
As elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia the military may come to play a
crucial role in the transformation of China’s politics. However, here too there is
uncertainty. It might boo imagined that with the reform era and the depoliticisation
of other aspects of state activity the PLA would follow suit, concentrate on
becoming a more professionalized, standing army and withdraw from civilian
affairs, and yet remain as the final arbiter and guarantor of state power.
It is certainly the case that the PLA has lobbied hard for its increased
professionalisation since the mid-1970s and a concomitant modernization of its
weaponry. However, it is far from clear that the PLA has completely withdrawn
from civilian affairs, though its involvement has changed.23 Charged with exist-
ing in a market-oriented economy the PLA, or rather its various constituent
units, has established a large number of enterprises, many of which have only a
very tenuous relationship to military activities. PLA unit budgets are now drafted
on the assumption that a certain percentage of funds and resources will be
generated by commercial and economic activities.24
23 See, for example: E Joffe the Chinese Army after Mao Wetdenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1987; <and R H Yang, J C Hu, P K H,’u and A N D Yang (Ed) Chinese Regionalism: The
security dimension West view Press, Boulder, 1994.
24 Tai-Ming Cheung “Profits over Professionalism: The PLA’s Economic Activities and the
Impact on Military Unity” in R H Yang, J C Hu, P K H Yu, and AN H D Yang (Ed) Chinese
Regionalism: The security dimension West view Press, Boulder, 1994, p.85.
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The extent to which the PLA’s economic activities may jeopardize or oth-
erwise influence its role as a major organizational support of the party-state is far
from clear. The possibility exists that the PLA will still not be able to stand
outside any possible civilian conflict or dispute and may to the contrary be
forced to intervene either partially or in its own interests. Thus, for example, it
would appear that military units have been mobilized to almost purely economic
ends during the various ‘commodity wars’ that have developed since the mid-
1980s.25 Economic competition with other non-military enterprises has already
led PI a units in Guangdong - where roughly half of all the PLA’s non-military
economic enterprises are physically located - into more direct forms of confron-
tation.26
Outside the formal party-state system - which includes the PLA -there is
opposition to the CCP and its policies, but accommodation is an inherent part of
political life not just for business people but even for those who seek more
radical political change. On the whole, both those seeking radical reform and the
CCP share to a remarkable extent a fear of social disorder. There is a common
recognition that too rapid political change might jeopardize the gains in the
standard of living made during the reform era.
The events of 1989 alienated intellectuals and drove many into exile where
they remain. Those who were involved in the movement for reform at the time saw
themselves as within the system rather than opposed to it root and branch, and
that position remains an unrecognized matter of some debate amongst those now
in exile. It is possible that the opposition in exile may develop new ideas and even
the organization to represent a significant threat to the CCP at some point in the
future. However, at present they face enormous structural problems. They are
divided, physically separate and disparate. They are fundamentally a movement
of intellectuals, and whilst that leads to a certain influence, remains a check on
their development as a mass movement. Moreover, they are outside China and
thus somewhat tainted in terms of their need to appeal to reactive nationalism.
Chinese intellectuals have flirted with Western ideas of democracy since
the end of the nineteenth century, but it could not be said that notions of
25 Chao Chien-min “Tiao-t’iao vs. k’uai-k’uai. A perennial dispute between the central and
local governments in Mainland China” in Is&ues and Studies August 1991, p 40; and D S G
Goodman “The PLA and Regionalism: Guangdong Province” in The Pacific Review Vol7No1,
1994, p.70.
26 D S Goodman “The PLA in Guangdong Province: Warlordism and Localism” in R H Yang,
J C Hu, P K H Yu, and A N D Yang (Ed) Chinese Regionalism: The security dimension West
view Press, Boulder, 1994, p.207.
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democracy or even civil society have developed strong foundations. For the
most part when democracy was spoken of in the PRC before 1989 the meaning
was either that of ‘socialist democracy’ -perfecting state socialism - or the “small
democracies’ - freedom of choice in work, home and marriage. Despite such
symbolism as the ‘Goddess of Democracy’ modeled on the Statue of Liberty
which appeared in Tiananmen Square in May, the demonstrations of 1989 did
little directly or contemporaneously to develop a new discourse or build
Towards civil society. However, the 1989 movement could now develop its
own mythology which may well play a role in China’s political future. There is a
foundation for consciousness of democracy that did not exist before and which
may develop, particularly with increased exposure to the rest of the world.
Given the role of the party-state in the genesis of new patterns of eco-
nomic development it would be remarkable to find the new entrepreneurs gener-
ated by China’s growth since the late 1970s articulating any demand for regime
change of any kind, let alone a Western-style democracy, and there is no evi-
dence to suggest that is the case. On the contrary at this stage as one might
expect with a continually rising market most of the energy of the new entrepre-
neurs is concentrated elsewhere.27 Moreover, the attraction of Western ideas,
even of capitalism, must be kept in perspective. Throughout the Twentieth Cen-
tury those seeking change in China have articulated a desire for a fundamentally
Chinese modernization, and for many the CCP still represents the best hope of
achieving that nationalist goal.
27 “The People’s Republic of China: The party-state, capitalist revolution and new entrepre-
neurs” in D S G Goodman and R Robison (ends) The New Rich in Asia: Mobile-phones,
McDonalds and Middle Class Revolution Routledge, London, 1996.
